Are we headed down a downward spiral to socialism? Much of the public is uneducated and indifferent to the political system and process. In addition, the demographic trends of our society (urbanization, social, and economic classes) are leading us toward socialism.
To add to these trends, voters seem to vote with their short term interest (tax cuts) as opposed to the long term views such as reducing the deficit, solving the oncoming social security crisis, or building a new energy infrastructure that will reduce our dependence on foreign oil. None of these long term problems can be solved without government intervention and cash.
But our system seems to support a short term view. How can the government take a long term view when the leadership changes every four years. National problems last longer than four years.
Historically citizenship had rights but those rights were balanced with responsibilities. Look at the French Revolution, citizens were required to serve in the army, creating the mass armies of the Napoleonic Era. How does this compare to the current situation in the US? What do we as a nation expect of our citizens other than paying taxes? What happened to the days of JFK when he said "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country." Our country today has a selfish attitude as opposed to a selfless attitude of service; an attitude of entitlement (the government needs to solve this problem for me) as opposed to an attitude of responsibility and self-reliance (I need to solve my own problems, the government is only there as a safety net).
As long as our citizens continue to vote with their short term interests and refuse to recognize the inherent responsibilities of a citizen in a democracy our country will continue this downward spiral to socialism.
2008-10-23
Napolean faults
Napoleon is considered to be a "Great Captain". A military genius.
However much of his success has to do with the the societal revolutions that occurred in France and allowed the massive conscription armies fired by nationalism more than his military genius. These societal revolutions also allowed open commissisons and upward mobility for soldiers that was merit based instead of based on birth.
Napoleon did not fare as well once the countries he faced experienced the same revolutions and were able to field similar armies. He created local resentment in the conquered territories creating the conditions for future revolt and warfare. This local resentment also forced him to maintain large garrisons further whittling down his combat power.
Of Napoleon's faults, the greatest was strategic greed. This fault forced him to abandon his army in Egypt to die. Later he again abandoned his army in Russia. In both cases, he overreached strategically. Strategic greed seemed to be his great weakness, unlike Fredrick the Great he was unable to limit his ambitions.
He did have many strengths. He allowed his subordinate commanders initiative. He gave them his intent (destroy the enemy) and allowed them to maneuver and take action of their own accord. By allowing his subordinate Corps commanders this initiative he was able to maneuver them on multiple axes, forcing his opponent to give battle, then the Corps could converge on the 'sound of the guns'.
As a final thought, many 'Great Captains' were both head of state and supreme military commander. Napoleon and Fredrick the Great are two examples. The advantage of having the strategic ends (dictated by the head of state) and the military ways decided by the same individual makes a huge difference in vision, unity of command, and effort. This close integration of policy and war might be a prerequisite to achieve the success that accompanies the title 'Great Captain.'
However much of his success has to do with the the societal revolutions that occurred in France and allowed the massive conscription armies fired by nationalism more than his military genius. These societal revolutions also allowed open commissisons and upward mobility for soldiers that was merit based instead of based on birth.
Napoleon did not fare as well once the countries he faced experienced the same revolutions and were able to field similar armies. He created local resentment in the conquered territories creating the conditions for future revolt and warfare. This local resentment also forced him to maintain large garrisons further whittling down his combat power.
Of Napoleon's faults, the greatest was strategic greed. This fault forced him to abandon his army in Egypt to die. Later he again abandoned his army in Russia. In both cases, he overreached strategically. Strategic greed seemed to be his great weakness, unlike Fredrick the Great he was unable to limit his ambitions.
He did have many strengths. He allowed his subordinate commanders initiative. He gave them his intent (destroy the enemy) and allowed them to maneuver and take action of their own accord. By allowing his subordinate Corps commanders this initiative he was able to maneuver them on multiple axes, forcing his opponent to give battle, then the Corps could converge on the 'sound of the guns'.
As a final thought, many 'Great Captains' were both head of state and supreme military commander. Napoleon and Fredrick the Great are two examples. The advantage of having the strategic ends (dictated by the head of state) and the military ways decided by the same individual makes a huge difference in vision, unity of command, and effort. This close integration of policy and war might be a prerequisite to achieve the success that accompanies the title 'Great Captain.'
2008-10-21
UN vs Islamic fundamental rights
Different culture have different views on individual rights. A great example of this is the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Islamic nations refused to sign the document. The Iranian representative, Rajaie-Khorassani stated the UDHR was "a secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition which could not be implemented by Muslims without trespassing the Islamic law." Islamic countries have since drafted their own version of the document titled the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam. See below for links to both versions.
How can we expect to impose a western style democracy on Iraq when our cultures are so different that we do not even agree on basic human rights?
UN version
Islamic version
How can we expect to impose a western style democracy on Iraq when our cultures are so different that we do not even agree on basic human rights?
UN version
Islamic version
Operation Check - Colombia
The operation as presented my MG Montoya was a perfect example of operational deception and information operations. However, there are some conspiracy theories about the actual execution of the rescue operation.
Misuse of Red Cross Emblem
Another interesting topic that came up during MG Montoya's lecture was that Columbia requested Most Favored Nation status regarding trade with the US but was rejected. It seems as if the government of Columbia is a great ally in the War on Drugs - why wouldn't we assist them? What do we have to lose?
Misuse of Red Cross Emblem
Another interesting topic that came up during MG Montoya's lecture was that Columbia requested Most Favored Nation status regarding trade with the US but was rejected. It seems as if the government of Columbia is a great ally in the War on Drugs - why wouldn't we assist them? What do we have to lose?
China strategy
China is an interesting problem for the United States. China is a growing power. Their resources, population, and location will make them a global power whether the US likes it or not.
The current National Security Strategy welcomes the rise of a peaceful China that is a responsible stakeholder with transparent intentions. It discusses building partnerships with China, but also discusses deterring China.
How do we build partnerships while having an adversarial relationship through deterrence?
I do think we have to build partnerships with China. How do we get them to have a vested interest in global stability. Global instability is just as bad for their economy as it is for ours, yet they contribute almost nothing to UN efforts. Imagine how many troops China could send to Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or the numerous conflicts in Africa.
As far as a military strategy toward China I think the only solution is a naval solution. We can never compete in a land war with China without resorting to nuclear weapons. Their numbers would simply overwhelm us. With a strong navy we can limit their global and regional influence and if needed cripple their economy with a blockade. Militarily, patience would have to be the key.
Bottom line: China needs to be a partner but keep a strong navy just in case.
The current National Security Strategy welcomes the rise of a peaceful China that is a responsible stakeholder with transparent intentions. It discusses building partnerships with China, but also discusses deterring China.
How do we build partnerships while having an adversarial relationship through deterrence?
I do think we have to build partnerships with China. How do we get them to have a vested interest in global stability. Global instability is just as bad for their economy as it is for ours, yet they contribute almost nothing to UN efforts. Imagine how many troops China could send to Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or the numerous conflicts in Africa.
As far as a military strategy toward China I think the only solution is a naval solution. We can never compete in a land war with China without resorting to nuclear weapons. Their numbers would simply overwhelm us. With a strong navy we can limit their global and regional influence and if needed cripple their economy with a blockade. Militarily, patience would have to be the key.
Bottom line: China needs to be a partner but keep a strong navy just in case.
Final nail in the coffin for McCain???
Powell decided to back Obama. What does this mean for the McCain campaign? What were Powells motives?
NY Times article on Powell / Obama endorsement
NY Times article on Powell / Obama endorsement
Fog and Friction on the Modern Battlefield
The computer age has revolutionized many aspects of our daily lives. For example, communication is now easier and faster than ever before. Veterans of previous wars would be astonished to see soldiers participating in video teleconferences with loved ones while deployed in a combat zone. Some modern theorists believe that given the realities of the computer age “fog and friction” are now obsolete on the modern battlefield. For Clausewitz, fog and friction were the central problem of warfare. Clausewitz’s fog and friction can be broken down into four elements: danger, physical exertion, uncertainty, and chance . This paper will show that while technological advances are great enablers on the modern battlefield, fog and friction still exist. Technology has not eliminated the components of danger, physical exertion, uncertainty, and chance from the modern battlefield.
“The sight of men being killed and mutilated moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity .”
The first element of fog and friction according to Clausewitz is that of danger. Danger for Clausewitz involved cannonballs and bursting shells whizzing in all directions as soldiers to the left and right are killed before you. This description of warfare is remarkable similar to that of today’s modern battlefield, IEDs, RPGs, and gunfire punctuate patrols in Iraq and Afghanistan. “After a blast, he looked down to find his severed leg lying in his lap .” Technology has given the modern soldier tools which can attack from afar without personal danger to the soldier. Aircraft can strike with precision munitions from thousands of feet in the air, rocket artillery systems can reach hundreds of miles, and armed UAVs can acquire and fire on targets without any personal danger. However, as shown by history and the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, an opponent facing overwhelming technological overmatch can negate his opponent’s technology advantage by resorting to an insurgency. Air power cannot win an insurgency, artillery is not effective for limited warfare in an urban environment, and UAVs, satellites, and other remote sensing methods cannot find terrorist cells without HUMINT obtained from soldiers and agents interfacing with the populace. The computer age has not removed danger from warfare. Warfare still involves soldiers occupying terrain and the dangers involved with that occupation.
“War is the realm of physical exertion and suffering .”
The second element of fog and friction according to Clausewitz is that of physical exertion. War is a collective effort of individuals. Soldiers individually, the army collectively, and the commander all have limits to the physical exertion they can endure. However, those limits are continually in flux and cannot be accurately measured. Leadership in war is about pushing soldiers to their limits to achieve the maximum effort. Those limits change as the situation changes, a defeated army surrounded on all sides can either give up or fight to the last man as the Japanese did in their defense of Iwo Jima and many other Pacific Islands during WWII. A victorious army can conduct a zealous pursuit or turn to rape and pillage the countryside. The computer age has organized the moving of men and material and made supplying an Army a more efficient process. However, soldiers or contractors still have to move that material through the war zone on a “grueling, two-day trip across 425 miles of those roadways .” The computer age has done nothing to eliminate the physical exertion involved in warfare.
“… information, how unreliable and transient it is ,”
The third element of fog and friction according to Clausewitz is that of uncertainty. Uncertainty is the ‘fog’ in Clausewitz’s definition of fog and friction. There is uncertainty in the location of friendly forces, the location of enemy forces, and most of all in the intention of the enemy commander. Modern technology has done a great deal to mitigate some of this uncertainty: Blue Force tracker and FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below) assist a modern commander in knowing the location of friendly forces. Satellite imagery and remote sensing technologies allow the commander an almost omniscient ‘eye in the sky’ to see the location of enemy forces in a conventional battlefield. However, as discussed before this technology gives no advantage in a counter-insurgency in which the enemy combatants blend in with the local populace. Remote sensors cannot distinguish friend from foe; only a soldier in danger with great physical exertion can gain credible intelligence to break the fog of war. In addition, beyond determining the location of enemy forces, remote sensing and technology cannot discern the intention of the opposing commander. The computer age has not lifted the fog of war.
“The element of chance, guesswork, and luck come to play a great part in war .”
The final element of fog and friction according to Clausewitz is that of chance. Clausewitz discusses chance under the term friction. “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult .” This is Murphy’s law stated in the 1800s. An army is a giant machine made of thousands of individual parts each of which can be affected by chance. Orders can be lost, delayed, or misinterpreted. Plans can be executed poorly or willfully disobeyed. Troop movements can be delayed, disrupted, or diverted by weather, enemy activity, or mechanical problems. Minor inconveniences can combine to create major problems that were unforeseen to the commander or staff. Danger and physical exertion only multiply the effect of chance. No development in the computer age can counteract the effect of chance on the battlefield. Chance is still a large component of the fog and friction of warfare.
In conclusion, the computer age has spawned many technological innovations that assist the warfighter, however, none of these gadgets or ‘systems of systems ’ has dissipated the fog and friction of war from the modern battlefield. Clausewitz’s ideas of ‘fog and friction’ are still valid and present in today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The modern battlefield is still a dangerous place filled with physical exertion, uncertainty, and chance.
“The sight of men being killed and mutilated moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity .”
The first element of fog and friction according to Clausewitz is that of danger. Danger for Clausewitz involved cannonballs and bursting shells whizzing in all directions as soldiers to the left and right are killed before you. This description of warfare is remarkable similar to that of today’s modern battlefield, IEDs, RPGs, and gunfire punctuate patrols in Iraq and Afghanistan. “After a blast, he looked down to find his severed leg lying in his lap .” Technology has given the modern soldier tools which can attack from afar without personal danger to the soldier. Aircraft can strike with precision munitions from thousands of feet in the air, rocket artillery systems can reach hundreds of miles, and armed UAVs can acquire and fire on targets without any personal danger. However, as shown by history and the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, an opponent facing overwhelming technological overmatch can negate his opponent’s technology advantage by resorting to an insurgency. Air power cannot win an insurgency, artillery is not effective for limited warfare in an urban environment, and UAVs, satellites, and other remote sensing methods cannot find terrorist cells without HUMINT obtained from soldiers and agents interfacing with the populace. The computer age has not removed danger from warfare. Warfare still involves soldiers occupying terrain and the dangers involved with that occupation.
“War is the realm of physical exertion and suffering .”
The second element of fog and friction according to Clausewitz is that of physical exertion. War is a collective effort of individuals. Soldiers individually, the army collectively, and the commander all have limits to the physical exertion they can endure. However, those limits are continually in flux and cannot be accurately measured. Leadership in war is about pushing soldiers to their limits to achieve the maximum effort. Those limits change as the situation changes, a defeated army surrounded on all sides can either give up or fight to the last man as the Japanese did in their defense of Iwo Jima and many other Pacific Islands during WWII. A victorious army can conduct a zealous pursuit or turn to rape and pillage the countryside. The computer age has organized the moving of men and material and made supplying an Army a more efficient process. However, soldiers or contractors still have to move that material through the war zone on a “grueling, two-day trip across 425 miles of those roadways .” The computer age has done nothing to eliminate the physical exertion involved in warfare.
“… information, how unreliable and transient it is ,”
The third element of fog and friction according to Clausewitz is that of uncertainty. Uncertainty is the ‘fog’ in Clausewitz’s definition of fog and friction. There is uncertainty in the location of friendly forces, the location of enemy forces, and most of all in the intention of the enemy commander. Modern technology has done a great deal to mitigate some of this uncertainty: Blue Force tracker and FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below) assist a modern commander in knowing the location of friendly forces. Satellite imagery and remote sensing technologies allow the commander an almost omniscient ‘eye in the sky’ to see the location of enemy forces in a conventional battlefield. However, as discussed before this technology gives no advantage in a counter-insurgency in which the enemy combatants blend in with the local populace. Remote sensors cannot distinguish friend from foe; only a soldier in danger with great physical exertion can gain credible intelligence to break the fog of war. In addition, beyond determining the location of enemy forces, remote sensing and technology cannot discern the intention of the opposing commander. The computer age has not lifted the fog of war.
“The element of chance, guesswork, and luck come to play a great part in war .”
The final element of fog and friction according to Clausewitz is that of chance. Clausewitz discusses chance under the term friction. “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult .” This is Murphy’s law stated in the 1800s. An army is a giant machine made of thousands of individual parts each of which can be affected by chance. Orders can be lost, delayed, or misinterpreted. Plans can be executed poorly or willfully disobeyed. Troop movements can be delayed, disrupted, or diverted by weather, enemy activity, or mechanical problems. Minor inconveniences can combine to create major problems that were unforeseen to the commander or staff. Danger and physical exertion only multiply the effect of chance. No development in the computer age can counteract the effect of chance on the battlefield. Chance is still a large component of the fog and friction of warfare.
In conclusion, the computer age has spawned many technological innovations that assist the warfighter, however, none of these gadgets or ‘systems of systems ’ has dissipated the fog and friction of war from the modern battlefield. Clausewitz’s ideas of ‘fog and friction’ are still valid and present in today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The modern battlefield is still a dangerous place filled with physical exertion, uncertainty, and chance.
Thoughts on the Future Combat System (FCS)
“The Future Combat System is soldier-centric .” Since the soldier is the centerpiece of this transformative effort as opposed to the ‘system-of systems’ concept that is currently being promoted, the Army should restructure and review the FCS. Three major areas that should be reviewed and restructured are as follows: the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) control of the FCS system, prioritization of resources within the FCS system, and production of components that do not meet a technical feasibility review.
The FCS is currently managed by the Boeing Company under the title of Lead Systems Integrator (LSI). This LSI management structure is unacceptable and does not provide proper oversight of the project because Boeing is a subcontractor as well as the overarching project manager. The Army decided to utilize an external management agency because it believed that it did not have the internal capacity to manage this large and complex project. Many other industries utilize a similar system to oversee projects outside their expertise. A great example of this management process is the construction industry. For example, a finance firm (the client) needs a new office building. The finance firm knows nothing about construction or engineering so they hire an architect/engineer (AE) firm to design their new office building. At the same time, the corporation hires a project management (PM) firm to oversee the AE firm and manage the various subcontractors that will actually construct the building. The difference between the construction example and the management system utilized by FCS is that Boeing is both the overall manager and a subcontractor. The Army has set up a management system in which the fox is watching the henhouse. Boeing decides whether Boeing is meeting the requirements of their contract and should get paid. The Army must either replace Boeing as the LSI or award Boeing’s portion of the FCS contract to another firm.
The second issue which needs reviewed is the prioritization of resources within the FCS system. While the soldier is the centerpiece of FCS, the network is the technological centerpiece. The network allows all the separate pieces of FCS to communicate and operate as a whole. The network needs to take priority before further development of any other systems. Right now the acquisition process is developing and procuring gadgets such as the Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), and the MULE. These gadgets are great enablers for deployed soldiers. However, separately they do not achieve the vision of FCS which “enables Soldiers to perceive, comprehend, shape, and dominate the future battlefield.” Currently the network is not ready. The standards by which the different FCS systems will interact are not yet defined and the technology to transport the large amounts of data is not yet mature. Because of this lack of standards and transport capacity, any current gadgets produced will be unable to network and talk with the total FCS once deployed. Without the network, the vision of sensors and equipment enabling the soldier cannot be realized. The network must be the priority.
Finally, the Army must conduct a technical feasibility review of the subcomponents of FCS. Scheduled production of any component based on immature technology should be deleted while allowing basic research and development of the underlying technology to continue. This will allow future production if technological breakthroughs are achieved without derailing the entire FCS acquisition process. The most critical technological issues relate to the manned FCS vehicles. The initial FCS vision calls for lightweight, mobile, survivable combat platforms. These vehicles would be strategically mobile (C130 capable) while maintaining the protection of the current heavy armor formations. The Army plans to begin construction of FCS in 2013 but the underlying armor technology (active and passive) and hybrid engine technology cannot meet this requirement. Building a new combat platform to replace the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank and the M2A3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle that is evolutionary rather than revolutionary is not cost effective. Existing vehicles can be equipped with communications equipment to allow access to the FCS network until the underlying technologies for a revolutionary new manned combat platform are mature.
In conclusion, FCS has several aspects that need reviewed and restructured. The LSI contract with Boeing needs restructured, the network needs to become the priority acquisition goal, and new manned combat vehicles should be removed from the FCS acquisition timeline until the underlying technology becomes more mature. The FCS must support the soldier while being economically efficient for the US taxpayer. The current acquisition structure and timeline do not allow that vision to become a reality.
The FCS is currently managed by the Boeing Company under the title of Lead Systems Integrator (LSI). This LSI management structure is unacceptable and does not provide proper oversight of the project because Boeing is a subcontractor as well as the overarching project manager. The Army decided to utilize an external management agency because it believed that it did not have the internal capacity to manage this large and complex project. Many other industries utilize a similar system to oversee projects outside their expertise. A great example of this management process is the construction industry. For example, a finance firm (the client) needs a new office building. The finance firm knows nothing about construction or engineering so they hire an architect/engineer (AE) firm to design their new office building. At the same time, the corporation hires a project management (PM) firm to oversee the AE firm and manage the various subcontractors that will actually construct the building. The difference between the construction example and the management system utilized by FCS is that Boeing is both the overall manager and a subcontractor. The Army has set up a management system in which the fox is watching the henhouse. Boeing decides whether Boeing is meeting the requirements of their contract and should get paid. The Army must either replace Boeing as the LSI or award Boeing’s portion of the FCS contract to another firm.
The second issue which needs reviewed is the prioritization of resources within the FCS system. While the soldier is the centerpiece of FCS, the network is the technological centerpiece. The network allows all the separate pieces of FCS to communicate and operate as a whole. The network needs to take priority before further development of any other systems. Right now the acquisition process is developing and procuring gadgets such as the Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), and the MULE. These gadgets are great enablers for deployed soldiers. However, separately they do not achieve the vision of FCS which “enables Soldiers to perceive, comprehend, shape, and dominate the future battlefield.” Currently the network is not ready. The standards by which the different FCS systems will interact are not yet defined and the technology to transport the large amounts of data is not yet mature. Because of this lack of standards and transport capacity, any current gadgets produced will be unable to network and talk with the total FCS once deployed. Without the network, the vision of sensors and equipment enabling the soldier cannot be realized. The network must be the priority.
Finally, the Army must conduct a technical feasibility review of the subcomponents of FCS. Scheduled production of any component based on immature technology should be deleted while allowing basic research and development of the underlying technology to continue. This will allow future production if technological breakthroughs are achieved without derailing the entire FCS acquisition process. The most critical technological issues relate to the manned FCS vehicles. The initial FCS vision calls for lightweight, mobile, survivable combat platforms. These vehicles would be strategically mobile (C130 capable) while maintaining the protection of the current heavy armor formations. The Army plans to begin construction of FCS in 2013 but the underlying armor technology (active and passive) and hybrid engine technology cannot meet this requirement. Building a new combat platform to replace the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank and the M2A3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle that is evolutionary rather than revolutionary is not cost effective. Existing vehicles can be equipped with communications equipment to allow access to the FCS network until the underlying technologies for a revolutionary new manned combat platform are mature.
In conclusion, FCS has several aspects that need reviewed and restructured. The LSI contract with Boeing needs restructured, the network needs to become the priority acquisition goal, and new manned combat vehicles should be removed from the FCS acquisition timeline until the underlying technology becomes more mature. The FCS must support the soldier while being economically efficient for the US taxpayer. The current acquisition structure and timeline do not allow that vision to become a reality.
Leadership philosophy
My leadership philosophy has two pillars, caring and ethics. These pillars are held together with systems that make routine activities routine.
The first pillar of my leadership philosophy is caring for soldiers. There are four sub-components of caring: freedom, development, openness, and families.
Freedom means trusting my soldiers’ intelligence and ingenuity by allowing them the freedom to exercise initiative. Initiative cannot come without risk of failure. I recognize that failure will occur and I will not penalize honest failures.
I acknowledge my personal obligation to ensure that soldiers have the skills required to execute their given mission. Professional development and challenging, realistic training will give them the necessary skills to succeed in their missions.
I care about my soldiers’ thoughts and ideas. I am open to new ideas and suggestions and encourage input and different points of view during the decision making process. By involving subordinates in the decision making process I will gain buy-in and commitment.
Finally, I care about my soldiers’ families. Without family support no soldier can serve and endure the hardships of Army life. A loving and supportive family allows deployed soldiers to focus on the mission and come home safely.
The second pillar of my leadership philosophy is ethics. Choose the harder right over the easier wrong. I have a no-tolerance policy regarding ethical behavior.
The first pillar of my leadership philosophy is caring for soldiers. There are four sub-components of caring: freedom, development, openness, and families.
Freedom means trusting my soldiers’ intelligence and ingenuity by allowing them the freedom to exercise initiative. Initiative cannot come without risk of failure. I recognize that failure will occur and I will not penalize honest failures.
I acknowledge my personal obligation to ensure that soldiers have the skills required to execute their given mission. Professional development and challenging, realistic training will give them the necessary skills to succeed in their missions.
I care about my soldiers’ thoughts and ideas. I am open to new ideas and suggestions and encourage input and different points of view during the decision making process. By involving subordinates in the decision making process I will gain buy-in and commitment.
Finally, I care about my soldiers’ families. Without family support no soldier can serve and endure the hardships of Army life. A loving and supportive family allows deployed soldiers to focus on the mission and come home safely.
The second pillar of my leadership philosophy is ethics. Choose the harder right over the easier wrong. I have a no-tolerance policy regarding ethical behavior.
Challenges facing the military
The military is facing many challenges. The three most dominant challenges we face are the current OPTEMPO level, the composition of the future force, and personnel. Each of these challenges leads to choices and assumption of risk. We must make the right choices now to prepare for the future and ensure the security of the United States of America.
The current OPTEMPO level of the United States military is unsustainable. The Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) which are the pointy end of our nation’s military might are either deployed in the global war on terrorism, resetting equipment and personnel following a deployment, or training for an upcoming deployment. The Army is stretched to its maximum capacity. The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is by nature an ideological struggle; a struggle between the values of the west (freedom, equality, and democracy) against the values of radical Islam. This ideological struggle will not be won in one battle or engagement but will continue across the globe for a long time. The GWOT has been termed the ‘long war’. Although the GWOT is the current conflict there are other possible threats looming on the horizon. The rise of China and the resurgence of Russia both present threats to our national security. The first choice that the Army faces is a choice in training. The counterinsurgency (COIN) skills required in Iraq and Afghanistan are different than the major theater of war (MTW) skills that will be required in a conflict with either China or Russia. The Army can either choose to train COIN skills, MTW skills, or a blend of both. Due to the current OPTEMPO level, the time available for training does not allow for a unit to be competent in both COIN and MTW. The skill set and mental attitude associated with COIN may also be incompatible with the skills required for a MTW conflict. Currently the Army is training the deploying BCTs exclusively on the COIN skills that will be required during their immediate upcoming assignment in the GWOT. We are assuming risk as a military; the current force will be unable to fight MTW should the need arise against China or Russia.
The next challenge facing the military is the composition of the future force. . The US military has traditionally dominated the battlespace through technology. Advanced main battle tanks, high-tech air superiority fighters, stealth bombers, smart bombs, and intelligence satellites are just a few of the technological tools that have given the US military a huge advantage against other nations. However, the current fight in the GWOT requires a low-tech infantry-centric force. Infantry soldiers are the only tool that can occupy land, interface with the populace, meet with local leaders, and root out the insurgents. As mentioned before, the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia require a different force structure. The military must be a more equipment-centric technological force to defeat those adversaries. If we assume that Department of Defense budgets will not increase and may even decrease over time a choice must be made between people and equipment. The Crusader, Comanche, and many other weapon systems have already been cut due to budgetary constraint. There is discussion that the F22 Raptor and Future Combat System (FCS) programs may also cut. Our leadership is assuming risk through these budgetary choices for the composition of the future force.
The final challenge our military faces is personnel. Retention and recruitment of officers and enlisted soldiers has become difficult for the Army. From a recruitment perspective, we are accepting incoming soldiers with lower test scores, less education, and we are even accepting convicted felons. On the retention side, the Army continues to pay huge re-enlistment bonuses to soldiers and even extended bonuses to officers for the first time. The basic problem can be summed up in the phrase, “The military is at war; America is at the mall.” Contrast this with the message JFK gave the American people, “It’s not what your country can do for you; it’s what you can do for your country.” The American public supports the soldier but does not support the war. This support of the soldier is more support in word than in deed. The American public will put a yellow ribbon magnet on their SUV but discourage their children from enlisting in the military. The urgency felt by America after the attacks on 9/11 has faded. The all-volunteer force draws from society and if society feels no urgency recruitment difficulties will continue. Our nation and military must re-energize the American public in the important of the GWOT and the importance of service to the nation or return to a draft army to meet the military’s needs.
The three most dominant challenges the military currently faces are the current OPTEMPO level, the composition of the future force, and personnel. The future of the United States of America and our success in the global war of terrorism depend on the choices we make regarding these challenges.
The current OPTEMPO level of the United States military is unsustainable. The Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) which are the pointy end of our nation’s military might are either deployed in the global war on terrorism, resetting equipment and personnel following a deployment, or training for an upcoming deployment. The Army is stretched to its maximum capacity. The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is by nature an ideological struggle; a struggle between the values of the west (freedom, equality, and democracy) against the values of radical Islam. This ideological struggle will not be won in one battle or engagement but will continue across the globe for a long time. The GWOT has been termed the ‘long war’. Although the GWOT is the current conflict there are other possible threats looming on the horizon. The rise of China and the resurgence of Russia both present threats to our national security. The first choice that the Army faces is a choice in training. The counterinsurgency (COIN) skills required in Iraq and Afghanistan are different than the major theater of war (MTW) skills that will be required in a conflict with either China or Russia. The Army can either choose to train COIN skills, MTW skills, or a blend of both. Due to the current OPTEMPO level, the time available for training does not allow for a unit to be competent in both COIN and MTW. The skill set and mental attitude associated with COIN may also be incompatible with the skills required for a MTW conflict. Currently the Army is training the deploying BCTs exclusively on the COIN skills that will be required during their immediate upcoming assignment in the GWOT. We are assuming risk as a military; the current force will be unable to fight MTW should the need arise against China or Russia.
The next challenge facing the military is the composition of the future force. . The US military has traditionally dominated the battlespace through technology. Advanced main battle tanks, high-tech air superiority fighters, stealth bombers, smart bombs, and intelligence satellites are just a few of the technological tools that have given the US military a huge advantage against other nations. However, the current fight in the GWOT requires a low-tech infantry-centric force. Infantry soldiers are the only tool that can occupy land, interface with the populace, meet with local leaders, and root out the insurgents. As mentioned before, the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia require a different force structure. The military must be a more equipment-centric technological force to defeat those adversaries. If we assume that Department of Defense budgets will not increase and may even decrease over time a choice must be made between people and equipment. The Crusader, Comanche, and many other weapon systems have already been cut due to budgetary constraint. There is discussion that the F22 Raptor and Future Combat System (FCS) programs may also cut. Our leadership is assuming risk through these budgetary choices for the composition of the future force.
The final challenge our military faces is personnel. Retention and recruitment of officers and enlisted soldiers has become difficult for the Army. From a recruitment perspective, we are accepting incoming soldiers with lower test scores, less education, and we are even accepting convicted felons. On the retention side, the Army continues to pay huge re-enlistment bonuses to soldiers and even extended bonuses to officers for the first time. The basic problem can be summed up in the phrase, “The military is at war; America is at the mall.” Contrast this with the message JFK gave the American people, “It’s not what your country can do for you; it’s what you can do for your country.” The American public supports the soldier but does not support the war. This support of the soldier is more support in word than in deed. The American public will put a yellow ribbon magnet on their SUV but discourage their children from enlisting in the military. The urgency felt by America after the attacks on 9/11 has faded. The all-volunteer force draws from society and if society feels no urgency recruitment difficulties will continue. Our nation and military must re-energize the American public in the important of the GWOT and the importance of service to the nation or return to a draft army to meet the military’s needs.
The three most dominant challenges the military currently faces are the current OPTEMPO level, the composition of the future force, and personnel. The future of the United States of America and our success in the global war of terrorism depend on the choices we make regarding these challenges.
2008-10-07
Festival of Ashura
One of the most interesting and disturbing events that I witnessed in Iraq was the festival of Ashura. It commemorates the killing of Husayn ibn Ali (grandson of Muhammad). He and a group of his followers (approx. 100 men) fought with a large army of about 4,000 men outside the Iraqi city of Karbala. Husayn and all his men were killed and their bodies were mutilated. Shi'as believe that this represented a battle between the forces of good and evil. Many Shi'as celebrate this festival with bloodletting and self flagellation.
My guidance would be if you are deployed to Iraq do not plan any activities outside the wire on the Festival of Ashura. See the below links of pictures.
BBC
Another site with pictures
2008-10-06
LTC promotion idea - LT retention
Perhaps at the COL promotion board they should look at LT retention. I believe this is a good indicator of command climate and a possible way to eliminate 'toxic' leaders from positions of further responsibility.
The Army promotes people based on results as any good organization. However, the Army has a much bigger mission than simple quarterly profits and so good leaders need to provide results but also be good ethical leaders that care for their subordinates and do not abuse them for personal gain. By measuring and rewarding LT retention, the Army could ensure that those good leaders can be distinguished from the 'bad' leaders that get results at the expense of their subordinates.
Some arguments against this are that some LTs will get our regardless of how good the command climate is (due to money, family, and many other reasons) and some LTs will stay in regardless of bad leadership (due to idealism, patriotism, and many other reasons). Both are valid points but in a large organization such as the Army it would be easy to assemble statistically significant data to create 'band of excellence' that would identify those outliers with great command climate and those with incredible poor command climate.
Other arguments point to LT retention as linked to the current OPTEMPO. By comparing retention results across the Army during one given time period, the 'band of excellence' mentioned above would account for that reality as well. All the commanders would've had similar deployment OPTEMPO considerations.
What are your thoughts?
The Army promotes people based on results as any good organization. However, the Army has a much bigger mission than simple quarterly profits and so good leaders need to provide results but also be good ethical leaders that care for their subordinates and do not abuse them for personal gain. By measuring and rewarding LT retention, the Army could ensure that those good leaders can be distinguished from the 'bad' leaders that get results at the expense of their subordinates.
Some arguments against this are that some LTs will get our regardless of how good the command climate is (due to money, family, and many other reasons) and some LTs will stay in regardless of bad leadership (due to idealism, patriotism, and many other reasons). Both are valid points but in a large organization such as the Army it would be easy to assemble statistically significant data to create 'band of excellence' that would identify those outliers with great command climate and those with incredible poor command climate.
Other arguments point to LT retention as linked to the current OPTEMPO. By comparing retention results across the Army during one given time period, the 'band of excellence' mentioned above would account for that reality as well. All the commanders would've had similar deployment OPTEMPO considerations.
What are your thoughts?
Human needs - Maslow
Much of what we do as leaders and soldiers involves dealing with peoples needs. A great model of human needs was created in the 1943 by Abraham Maslow.
Physiological needs include breathing, drinking, eating, excretion, and sex.
Safety needs include personal security from crime, financial security, health and well-being, and a safety net against accidents/illness.
Social needs include friendship, sexual intimacy, and having a supportive and communicative family.
Esteem needs include self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others.
Only once all these lower needs are met can a human reach self-actualization and the realization of their own potential. Higher needs only come into focus when lower needs are satisfied.
I believe this is an accurate model of human behavior.
The original article is below.
Maslow's hierarchy of needs - original article
Physiological needs include breathing, drinking, eating, excretion, and sex.
Safety needs include personal security from crime, financial security, health and well-being, and a safety net against accidents/illness.
Social needs include friendship, sexual intimacy, and having a supportive and communicative family.
Esteem needs include self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others.
Only once all these lower needs are met can a human reach self-actualization and the realization of their own potential. Higher needs only come into focus when lower needs are satisfied.
I believe this is an accurate model of human behavior.
The original article is below.
Maslow's hierarchy of needs - original article
Strategic corporal
This is a classic article on the importance of our young soldiers in today's modern warfare. This importance comes from several reasons - one of which is the omni-presence of the media which makes small decisions international news in seconds.
Strategic Corporal - GEN Krulak
Strategic Corporal - GEN Krulak
Inherent stability of democracies???
Much of our foreign policy depends on the assumption that democracies will not attack each other since the costs a population bears are too great (both economic cost and death). History supports this assumption. However, a democracy with a population base of religious idealists would elect a government of religious idealists. Religious idealists are by nature not prone to compromise or rationality. They hold their values and beliefs to be supreme to any other value or belief system. This democracy would not hesitate to attack other democracies that did not believe as they believe. So the true test of a stable government is not what type of government they have but the tolerance of the people. An intolerant people will lead to an intolerant government - not a stable and peaceful government regardless of the type of government.
Historical reference for Army stability operations
Interesting - the Army did extensive stability operations following WWII, collected the data, and wrote a history.
Army manual on Civil Affairs post WWII
Another interesting article on the US military's historical experience in stability operations from the combat studies institute.
The US Military's Experience in Stability operations 1789-2005
Army manual on Civil Affairs post WWII
Another interesting article on the US military's historical experience in stability operations from the combat studies institute.
The US Military's Experience in Stability operations 1789-2005
Interesting quotes from GEN Zinni ref. Iraq war
The following quotes are from former CENTCOM commander Tony Zinni. However, one must always question the motivation. Motivation to tell the truth, sell or hype a book, or an attempt to justify your own actions. You decide.
"In the lead-up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw, at a minimum, true dereliction, negligence, and irresponsibility; at worst, lying, incompetence, and corruption." - Battle Ready
"I knew the intelligence; I saw it right up to the day of the war. I was asked at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing a month before the war if I thought the threat was imminent. I didn't. Many of the people I know that were involved in the intelligence side of this, or, or in the military felt the same way. I saw the -- what this town is known for: spin, cherry-picking facts, using metaphors to evoke certain emotional responses, or, or shading the, the context. We, we know the mushroom clouds and, and the other things that were all described that the media's covered well. I saw on the ground, though, a sort of walking away from 10 years worth of planning.
You know, ever since the end of the first Gulf War, there have been -- there's been planning by serious officers and planners and others, and policies put in place. Ten years worth of planning, you know, were thrown away; troop levels dismissed out of hand; General Shinseki basically insulted for speaking the truth and giving a, an honest opinion; the lack of cohesive approach to how we deal with the aftermath; the political, economic, social reconstruction of a nation, which is no small task; a belief in these exiles that anyone in the region, anyone that had any knowledge would tell you were not credible on the ground; and on and on and on. Decisions to disband the army that were not in the initial plans. I mean there’s a series of disastrous mistakes. We just heard the secretary of state say these were tactical mistakes. These were not tactical mistakes. These were strategic mistakes, mistakes of policy made back here. Don't blame the troops. They're the ones that perform the tactics on the ground. They've been magnificent. If anything saves this, it will be them." - Interview with Meet the Press
Source for both quotes
"In the lead-up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw, at a minimum, true dereliction, negligence, and irresponsibility; at worst, lying, incompetence, and corruption." - Battle Ready
"I knew the intelligence; I saw it right up to the day of the war. I was asked at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing a month before the war if I thought the threat was imminent. I didn't. Many of the people I know that were involved in the intelligence side of this, or, or in the military felt the same way. I saw the -- what this town is known for: spin, cherry-picking facts, using metaphors to evoke certain emotional responses, or, or shading the, the context. We, we know the mushroom clouds and, and the other things that were all described that the media's covered well. I saw on the ground, though, a sort of walking away from 10 years worth of planning.
You know, ever since the end of the first Gulf War, there have been -- there's been planning by serious officers and planners and others, and policies put in place. Ten years worth of planning, you know, were thrown away; troop levels dismissed out of hand; General Shinseki basically insulted for speaking the truth and giving a, an honest opinion; the lack of cohesive approach to how we deal with the aftermath; the political, economic, social reconstruction of a nation, which is no small task; a belief in these exiles that anyone in the region, anyone that had any knowledge would tell you were not credible on the ground; and on and on and on. Decisions to disband the army that were not in the initial plans. I mean there’s a series of disastrous mistakes. We just heard the secretary of state say these were tactical mistakes. These were not tactical mistakes. These were strategic mistakes, mistakes of policy made back here. Don't blame the troops. They're the ones that perform the tactics on the ground. They've been magnificent. If anything saves this, it will be them." - Interview with Meet the Press
Source for both quotes
2008-10-02
Rick Atkinson speech on the media
We had a really good media panel to talk about military media relations. The best speaker was Rick Atkinson who writes for the Washington Post. He's also a military historian (won the Pulitzer prize for "An Army at Dawn". More recently he was embedded with the 101st in Iraq. He wrote a good series on IEDs in Iraq. Washington Post Article - Left of Boom He also mentioned a piece called "Night of 1000 casualties" about Somalia - although I couldn't find any links to that article on the web.
He cut the ice with a great self depreciating joke about journalists. A man went into the doctor for a brain transplant. The doctor told him it would cost $100/oz to get the brain of army officer, $200/oz for the brain of historian, and $1000/oz to get the brain of journalist. The man was taken aback by the high price for the journalist and asked why. The doctor responded, "Do you know how many journalists it takes to get 1 oz of brain?"
A quote he attributed to Omar Bradley reference dealing with the media jumped out at me. He said he had "80k soldiers which meant about 250k family members. Those family members had a right to know what kind of man was leading their soldiers." Really we do owe it to the public to be open with the media. They have entrusted us with the lives of their sons and daughters.
Another interesting comment although I can't remember who he attributed this one to was that "the military officer is continually fighting a war on two fronts. A war with the enemy which is intermittent and a war with his own government which is continuous." This also points to a great need to tell our story to the media.
The best advice he gave was to that we military officers then to down play our accomplishments. Bad news sells. We have a culture of "It's just our job". However, just doing your job isn't a very exciting newspaper article. So to get the good story told and published about the great accomplishments your unit has made in Iraq or Afghanistan, tell the reporter how hard it really was to make that good news story happen.
The most impressive story he told was about The Death of CPT Waskow - Ernie Pyle. The writing was incredibly eloquent about the death of CPT Waskow and the honor and respect his peers and soldiers showed. One of the literary themes that is repeated throughout the work is the line, "Then they laid him on the ground in the shadow of the low stone wall alongside the road." I highly encourage you to follow the above link and read the article. The question I would ask is whether such a powerful piece of journalist could ever be written in today's era of 24 hour news coverage which seems to only have time for the 15 second sound bite? If written would it even be published? We have lost a great deal of emotion, depth, and power when mass journalism changed from print to TV and now Internet.
Some final media thoughts of of my own is the tragedy of the government blackout on pictures of all the coffins coming home. That is news just like any news from inside Iraq. The public has a right to see that visible reminder of the human cost of war. War is not sterile and antiseptic. War is bloody and messy. People get wounded and die. The American public needs to know that.
He cut the ice with a great self depreciating joke about journalists. A man went into the doctor for a brain transplant. The doctor told him it would cost $100/oz to get the brain of army officer, $200/oz for the brain of historian, and $1000/oz to get the brain of journalist. The man was taken aback by the high price for the journalist and asked why. The doctor responded, "Do you know how many journalists it takes to get 1 oz of brain?"
A quote he attributed to Omar Bradley reference dealing with the media jumped out at me. He said he had "80k soldiers which meant about 250k family members. Those family members had a right to know what kind of man was leading their soldiers." Really we do owe it to the public to be open with the media. They have entrusted us with the lives of their sons and daughters.
Another interesting comment although I can't remember who he attributed this one to was that "the military officer is continually fighting a war on two fronts. A war with the enemy which is intermittent and a war with his own government which is continuous." This also points to a great need to tell our story to the media.
The best advice he gave was to that we military officers then to down play our accomplishments. Bad news sells. We have a culture of "It's just our job". However, just doing your job isn't a very exciting newspaper article. So to get the good story told and published about the great accomplishments your unit has made in Iraq or Afghanistan, tell the reporter how hard it really was to make that good news story happen.
The most impressive story he told was about The Death of CPT Waskow - Ernie Pyle. The writing was incredibly eloquent about the death of CPT Waskow and the honor and respect his peers and soldiers showed. One of the literary themes that is repeated throughout the work is the line, "Then they laid him on the ground in the shadow of the low stone wall alongside the road." I highly encourage you to follow the above link and read the article. The question I would ask is whether such a powerful piece of journalist could ever be written in today's era of 24 hour news coverage which seems to only have time for the 15 second sound bite? If written would it even be published? We have lost a great deal of emotion, depth, and power when mass journalism changed from print to TV and now Internet.
Some final media thoughts of of my own is the tragedy of the government blackout on pictures of all the coffins coming home. That is news just like any news from inside Iraq. The public has a right to see that visible reminder of the human cost of war. War is not sterile and antiseptic. War is bloody and messy. People get wounded and die. The American public needs to know that.
2008-10-01
Hypocrasy of American Christianity?
What happened to the concept taught by Jesus of turn the other cheek?
How does this concept play out in our international relations and our justice code?
Just a thought. Comment please
How does this concept play out in our international relations and our justice code?
Just a thought. Comment please
American culture
We often judge other cultures as bad. I am not a relativist - I do believe there are universal standards of good and bad. But it is good to understand our own culture and the underlying values and beliefs that make up American culture before we compare and judge other cultures. A great article that discusses aspects of American culture is The Values Americans Live By - L. Robert Kohls. I have summarized his main points below.
1. Personal Control over the Environment - We believe that man should control nature. Contrast this with other culture's view of fate.
2. Change - We believe that change is good. Compare this with other culture's emphasis on tradition.
3. Time and Its Control - We live our lives by schedules, using them for daily planning and execution. Compare this to other culture's emphasis on human interaction. In those cultures, time takes a back seat to personal relationships and social interaction.
4. Equality / Egalitarianism - 'All men and created equal' - comes straight from our Declaration of Independence. Compare this to other societies emphasis on hierarchy, rank, and status which give those societies a sense of security and certainty. The greatest example of this difference is in the caste system in India.
5. Individual and Privacy - Americans view the individual as unique and special. We fiercely resist being thought of as representative of any homogeneous group. Compare this to other society's sense of group welfare which takes priority to the individual. Privacy in these cultures is also subordinate to the group welfare.
6. Self-Help Control - Compare to other cultures tradition of birthright inheritance.
7. Competition and Free Enterprise - Americans believe that competition forces each person to produce their very best. Contrast this with the concept of cooperation which is central to many cultures. This was the essential conflict on the Cold War - a conflict between competition / capitalism and cooperation / communism.
8. Future Orientation - Americans press all effort and energy into achieving a better future. Other cultures are much more focused on the past.
9. Action / Work Orientation - For an American, any action is superior to inaction versus a sense of 'being' central to many other cultures.
Much of our work ethic and orientation comes from the religious background the Protestant Work Ethic stems from John Calvin and Martin Luther's concept that hard work (which leads to worldy success) is a sign of personal salvation. They believed that God would judge man by his works. However, many modern Christian denomination are taking a different view, one in which you are saved through faith alone - independent of works.
Another cultural shift is occuring with the urbanization of America. Much of the hard work ethic also stems from the rural, agricultural heritiage of the colonists. This work ethic may dim as America becomes more and more urbanized.
10. Informality - Many cultures are much more formal than ours.
11. Directness, Openness, and Honesty - Other cultures will use indirect or ritual methods to deliver unpleasant information. Also the concept of saving 'face' is much more important in other cultures.
12. Practicality and Efficiency - This is contrasted with idealism. The classic struggle of what is versus what should be.
13. Materialism / Aquisitiveness - Compare this value with the emphasis by many other cultures on spiritualism and detachment.
Even if you don't personally agree with some of these values, it is clear that they do define our behavior to an outsider on a macro sense. Many times values central to our culture are contrary with much of the world. In a black and white world, most these values fall into the gray area with neither set being absolutely wrong. I personally judge the values of individualism, informality, and materialism as bad. So know yourself before judging others.
1. Personal Control over the Environment - We believe that man should control nature. Contrast this with other culture's view of fate.
2. Change - We believe that change is good. Compare this with other culture's emphasis on tradition.
3. Time and Its Control - We live our lives by schedules, using them for daily planning and execution. Compare this to other culture's emphasis on human interaction. In those cultures, time takes a back seat to personal relationships and social interaction.
4. Equality / Egalitarianism - 'All men and created equal' - comes straight from our Declaration of Independence. Compare this to other societies emphasis on hierarchy, rank, and status which give those societies a sense of security and certainty. The greatest example of this difference is in the caste system in India.
5. Individual and Privacy - Americans view the individual as unique and special. We fiercely resist being thought of as representative of any homogeneous group. Compare this to other society's sense of group welfare which takes priority to the individual. Privacy in these cultures is also subordinate to the group welfare.
6. Self-Help Control - Compare to other cultures tradition of birthright inheritance.
7. Competition and Free Enterprise - Americans believe that competition forces each person to produce their very best. Contrast this with the concept of cooperation which is central to many cultures. This was the essential conflict on the Cold War - a conflict between competition / capitalism and cooperation / communism.
8. Future Orientation - Americans press all effort and energy into achieving a better future. Other cultures are much more focused on the past.
9. Action / Work Orientation - For an American, any action is superior to inaction versus a sense of 'being' central to many other cultures.
Much of our work ethic and orientation comes from the religious background the Protestant Work Ethic stems from John Calvin and Martin Luther's concept that hard work (which leads to worldy success) is a sign of personal salvation. They believed that God would judge man by his works. However, many modern Christian denomination are taking a different view, one in which you are saved through faith alone - independent of works.
Another cultural shift is occuring with the urbanization of America. Much of the hard work ethic also stems from the rural, agricultural heritiage of the colonists. This work ethic may dim as America becomes more and more urbanized.
10. Informality - Many cultures are much more formal than ours.
11. Directness, Openness, and Honesty - Other cultures will use indirect or ritual methods to deliver unpleasant information. Also the concept of saving 'face' is much more important in other cultures.
12. Practicality and Efficiency - This is contrasted with idealism. The classic struggle of what is versus what should be.
13. Materialism / Aquisitiveness - Compare this value with the emphasis by many other cultures on spiritualism and detachment.
Even if you don't personally agree with some of these values, it is clear that they do define our behavior to an outsider on a macro sense. Many times values central to our culture are contrary with much of the world. In a black and white world, most these values fall into the gray area with neither set being absolutely wrong. I personally judge the values of individualism, informality, and materialism as bad. So know yourself before judging others.
Human nature
The endless debates in politics and religion often stems from a basic assumption about human nature. On the one hand, many believe that humans are inherently good. With this view, prisons can indeed be effective at reforming criminals and returning them to productive members of society. With the opposite view that humans are inherently evil, prisons will never be effective at reform but are only a way to keep dangerous criminals off the street.
Of the philosophers, Hobbes perhaps illustrates this best with his description of the state of nature. In the state of nature, everyone has a right to everything. This leads to inevitable conflict as each individual tries to take by force all the resources or assets his personal power allows. This state is described by Hobbes as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" - Leviathan. In this Hobbesian view, individuals give up their 'natural' rights to society in exchange for protection or security.
I believe that man is by nature evil. Another illustration of this is the human race's brilliance in finding new and more efficient ways to kill each other.
A great article - found by Rick Garcia - talks about the state of nature using rats as a proxy for humans. The rats got along well as long as food and resources were amply provided, but once resources became scarce the rats engaged in very human-like warfare. NIH rat article
How will warfare change as resources (oil, food, water) become more scare? Are the conflicts in Africa and example of these resource type conflicts and a precursor to similar conflicts that will erupt around the globe as people fight for limited resources?
Of the philosophers, Hobbes perhaps illustrates this best with his description of the state of nature. In the state of nature, everyone has a right to everything. This leads to inevitable conflict as each individual tries to take by force all the resources or assets his personal power allows. This state is described by Hobbes as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" - Leviathan. In this Hobbesian view, individuals give up their 'natural' rights to society in exchange for protection or security.
I believe that man is by nature evil. Another illustration of this is the human race's brilliance in finding new and more efficient ways to kill each other.
A great article - found by Rick Garcia - talks about the state of nature using rats as a proxy for humans. The rats got along well as long as food and resources were amply provided, but once resources became scarce the rats engaged in very human-like warfare. NIH rat article
How will warfare change as resources (oil, food, water) become more scare? Are the conflicts in Africa and example of these resource type conflicts and a precursor to similar conflicts that will erupt around the globe as people fight for limited resources?
Civil military relations and George Washington
George Washington is rightfully considered the father of our country. He was instrumental in securing success during the American Revolution. However, I believe his contributions go far deeper than his military successes. The United States has been remarkably free of the military coups that have plagued much of the rest of the world. South America is a prime example, with most of their countries going through repeated military coups. What makes the United States different?
Some would pose that it is the subordination of military to civilian rule that is written into the constitution. Others would pose that it is the checks and balances between the various branches of government. Still others would pose that it is the fair and representative government that was created by the founding fathers that prevents the military coups that have plagued much of the rest of the world.
All the previously stated reasons do not prevent a charismatic military commander loved by his subordinates from ordering his forces to march on Washington DC to right some real or perceived wrong against the military by the federal government.
I believe that it was the personal example of George Washington himself that has prevented military coups in this nation. George Washington declined the offer of 'Emperor' following his success against the British. In addition, he resigned his commission and returned it to Congress in 1783 before accepting the presidency. His example set the standard for all future military officers. His spirit in the minds of military officers is what has prevented any military coups in the US.
However, civil military relations are complicated now even though there is no threat of revolution. The military needs to advise the civilian leadership so that the elected representatives of the people (president and members of congress) can make well informed decisions about the application of military force to achieve national interests. When the civilian leadership listen to their military advisors, weighs the alternatives and consequences, and then makes a decision which the military executes is a good and healthy relationship. However, are relations between the military and the civilian leadership good right now because the civilian leadership is listening or because the civilian leadership has filled their advisor roles with 'yes' men?
Much arm chair quarterbacking has been done on the decision to go to Iraq. Hindsight is always 20/20. During the period leading up to the war, there was much discussion between the military and civilian leadership on the wisdom of going to Iraq. Several generals advised President Bush not to go to war in Iraq: GEN Zinni, Shinseki, and Abizaid to name a few. GEN Franks and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld supported the invasion of Iraq. This dissension among the military advisors to the president suggests a healthy military relationship with the civil authority. Our leadership listened to opposing views, weighed the options, and still decided to go to Iraq.
The military is an instrument of public policy wielded by the executive branch of government. We will give advice and tell the civilian leadership that it is a bad idea, but we will execute our orders once the decision has been made. One caution: VOTE - ensure that the military is an instrument of the public will and not the tool of the political elite unresponsive to the public will.
Some would pose that it is the subordination of military to civilian rule that is written into the constitution. Others would pose that it is the checks and balances between the various branches of government. Still others would pose that it is the fair and representative government that was created by the founding fathers that prevents the military coups that have plagued much of the rest of the world.
All the previously stated reasons do not prevent a charismatic military commander loved by his subordinates from ordering his forces to march on Washington DC to right some real or perceived wrong against the military by the federal government.
I believe that it was the personal example of George Washington himself that has prevented military coups in this nation. George Washington declined the offer of 'Emperor' following his success against the British. In addition, he resigned his commission and returned it to Congress in 1783 before accepting the presidency. His example set the standard for all future military officers. His spirit in the minds of military officers is what has prevented any military coups in the US.
However, civil military relations are complicated now even though there is no threat of revolution. The military needs to advise the civilian leadership so that the elected representatives of the people (president and members of congress) can make well informed decisions about the application of military force to achieve national interests. When the civilian leadership listen to their military advisors, weighs the alternatives and consequences, and then makes a decision which the military executes is a good and healthy relationship. However, are relations between the military and the civilian leadership good right now because the civilian leadership is listening or because the civilian leadership has filled their advisor roles with 'yes' men?
Much arm chair quarterbacking has been done on the decision to go to Iraq. Hindsight is always 20/20. During the period leading up to the war, there was much discussion between the military and civilian leadership on the wisdom of going to Iraq. Several generals advised President Bush not to go to war in Iraq: GEN Zinni, Shinseki, and Abizaid to name a few. GEN Franks and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld supported the invasion of Iraq. This dissension among the military advisors to the president suggests a healthy military relationship with the civil authority. Our leadership listened to opposing views, weighed the options, and still decided to go to Iraq.
The military is an instrument of public policy wielded by the executive branch of government. We will give advice and tell the civilian leadership that it is a bad idea, but we will execute our orders once the decision has been made. One caution: VOTE - ensure that the military is an instrument of the public will and not the tool of the political elite unresponsive to the public will.
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