Thoughts on the Future Combat System (FCS)

“The Future Combat System is soldier-centric .” Since the soldier is the centerpiece of this transformative effort as opposed to the ‘system-of systems’ concept that is currently being promoted, the Army should restructure and review the FCS. Three major areas that should be reviewed and restructured are as follows: the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) control of the FCS system, prioritization of resources within the FCS system, and production of components that do not meet a technical feasibility review.

The FCS is currently managed by the Boeing Company under the title of Lead Systems Integrator (LSI). This LSI management structure is unacceptable and does not provide proper oversight of the project because Boeing is a subcontractor as well as the overarching project manager. The Army decided to utilize an external management agency because it believed that it did not have the internal capacity to manage this large and complex project. Many other industries utilize a similar system to oversee projects outside their expertise. A great example of this management process is the construction industry. For example, a finance firm (the client) needs a new office building. The finance firm knows nothing about construction or engineering so they hire an architect/engineer (AE) firm to design their new office building. At the same time, the corporation hires a project management (PM) firm to oversee the AE firm and manage the various subcontractors that will actually construct the building. The difference between the construction example and the management system utilized by FCS is that Boeing is both the overall manager and a subcontractor. The Army has set up a management system in which the fox is watching the henhouse. Boeing decides whether Boeing is meeting the requirements of their contract and should get paid. The Army must either replace Boeing as the LSI or award Boeing’s portion of the FCS contract to another firm.

The second issue which needs reviewed is the prioritization of resources within the FCS system. While the soldier is the centerpiece of FCS, the network is the technological centerpiece. The network allows all the separate pieces of FCS to communicate and operate as a whole. The network needs to take priority before further development of any other systems. Right now the acquisition process is developing and procuring gadgets such as the Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV), and the MULE. These gadgets are great enablers for deployed soldiers. However, separately they do not achieve the vision of FCS which “enables Soldiers to perceive, comprehend, shape, and dominate the future battlefield.” Currently the network is not ready. The standards by which the different FCS systems will interact are not yet defined and the technology to transport the large amounts of data is not yet mature. Because of this lack of standards and transport capacity, any current gadgets produced will be unable to network and talk with the total FCS once deployed. Without the network, the vision of sensors and equipment enabling the soldier cannot be realized. The network must be the priority.

Finally, the Army must conduct a technical feasibility review of the subcomponents of FCS. Scheduled production of any component based on immature technology should be deleted while allowing basic research and development of the underlying technology to continue. This will allow future production if technological breakthroughs are achieved without derailing the entire FCS acquisition process. The most critical technological issues relate to the manned FCS vehicles. The initial FCS vision calls for lightweight, mobile, survivable combat platforms. These vehicles would be strategically mobile (C130 capable) while maintaining the protection of the current heavy armor formations. The Army plans to begin construction of FCS in 2013 but the underlying armor technology (active and passive) and hybrid engine technology cannot meet this requirement. Building a new combat platform to replace the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank and the M2A3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle that is evolutionary rather than revolutionary is not cost effective. Existing vehicles can be equipped with communications equipment to allow access to the FCS network until the underlying technologies for a revolutionary new manned combat platform are mature.

In conclusion, FCS has several aspects that need reviewed and restructured. The LSI contract with Boeing needs restructured, the network needs to become the priority acquisition goal, and new manned combat vehicles should be removed from the FCS acquisition timeline until the underlying technology becomes more mature. The FCS must support the soldier while being economically efficient for the US taxpayer. The current acquisition structure and timeline do not allow that vision to become a reality.